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The Intrapreneurial State: Singapore’s Emergence in the Smart and 
Sustainable Urban Solutions Field 
The East Asian developmental state model and the Anglo-American entrepreneurial 
state model profile varied ways in which the state continues to intervene in economic 
development. These models are developed by different disciplines and against diverse 
contexts to capture extrasocietal state responses to neoliberalism and globalisation but 
leave the intrasocietal pre-conditions for state evolution little explored. We elaborate 
the concept of state intrapreneurialism as one way of understanding the 
interrelationship between economic and state transformation – one ingredient of the 
intrasocietal preconditions underpinning the responses to extrasocietal changes 
emphasised in the post-developmental state literature. Drawing on the case of 
Singapore’s emergence in the field of smart/sustainable urban solutions, the subsidiary 
contributions of this paper are to suggest intrapreneurship as a specific and enduring 
advantage within the developmental state model, especially when set against its 
limitations signalled in the post-developmental state literature. 
Keywords: intrapreneurialism, developmental state, entrepreneurial state, Singapore, 
smart and sustainable urban solutions 
 
Introduction 
Processes of neoliberalisation have called forth theories which emphasize the 
entrepreneurialism of states (Eisinger, 1988; Mazzucato, 2013) and the emergence of a 
distinctly post-developmental state (Yeung, 2016). Yet accounts of both the post-
developmental and entrepreneurial state have largely focused on the extrasocietal origins of 
state responses to neoliberalisation, decentralisation and globalisation, but fail to appreciate 
the extent, nature and sources of state intrapreneurship as one crucial intrasocietal pre-
condition for the state to deal with external challenges.  
Few good definitions of intrapreneurialism exist and those that do are found in 
connection to the private sector. Adapting these definitions, state intrapreneurship can be 
defined as the latent or actually existing entrepreneurialism apparent within public sector 
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bureaucracies. State intrapreneurialism is not new but we suggest that a focus upon it offers 
an important theoretical advance since: its sources and significance have not been clearly 
specified to date; it remains a largely overlooked feature in the extant literature on varieties of 
the state; it is one vital ingredient in the transformation from one ‘state of stateness’ (Nettl, 
1968) to another. We argue that the concept of state intrapreneurship provides an additional 
organising framework with which to address the neglected positive role of states in effecting 
structural economic transformation (Bardhan, 2016) and further specify the causes of 
transition from developmental to post-developmental states in Asia. We believe this paper 
complements the extant literature – which tends to emphasise the extrasocietal sources of the 
post-developmental state transition – with a discussion of its neglected intrasocietal 
counterpart. We focus on the example of Singapore, bearing in mind that Singapore is unique 
among its Asian neighbours (Olds and Yeung 2004).  
In what follows we first review the literature on developmental and entrepreneurial 
states, which leads us to focus on intrapreneurialism as partially framed at the junctions 
between the two as a mechanism of transformation from within the state. We then describe 
the methods used in connection with a case study of Singapore. Section four presents the case 
study, focused on the role of the state in stimulating its smart/sustainable urban solutions 
sector. Section five summarises the key arguments and their implications for future research.    
After the developmental state: intrapreneurialism and transformation  
In this section we recount facets of the developmental, entrepreneurial and post-
developmental state models, and how they separately deal with the states’ intrasocietal 
dynamics and extrasocietal reactions. Then we outline states’ intrasocietal adjustments in 
terms of ‘state intrapreneurialism’ as a framework for analysis.  
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Four aspects of the developmental state   
The developmental state model dates to Johnson (1982) in his study of the post-war 
industrialisation process of Japan. The label is ‘a shorthand for the seamless web of political, 
bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life’ (Woo-Cummings 1999, 
p.1). Notwithstanding the lack of a unified definition, we extract four common features of the 
developmental state from the literature (represented in the horizontal sequence of ‘leadership-
industrial priorities-action power-outcomes’ in figure 1) and highlight the feedback 
mechanism that joins them.  
Priority setting is the state’s proactive role in strategically predicting and supporting 
next generation industries. This function is not confined to ‘following the market’, but 
involves actively forecasting and preparing the pre-conditions (Johnson, 1982). Wade (1990, 
p.334) compared the government interventions in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan concluding 
that they had not so much picked winners as made them. That ‘the potency of a 
developmental state lies in its capacity and capability to anticipate and respond to economic 
change’ (Low 2001, p.414) is revealing of the transformative capabilities implied in priority 
setting.  
Leadership signals capabilities that exceed bureaucratic management and embrace the 
intrasocietal-facing skills of coordinating the competing interests of different social classes 
and designing appropriate institutional infrastructures. The potential connections between the 
leadership of states and enterprises have since been developed in discussions of ‘bureaucratic 
embedded autonomy’ (Evans, 1995): a term used to describe the close relationship between 
an elite bureaucracy and government-linked companies (GLCs), and between economic goals 
and social welfare ensuring consensus is reached across different walks of life. South Korea 
was successful in achieving this embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995) as were Singapore and 
Hong Kong (Yu 1997). This elite-based, (semi-)closed leadership structure of high stateness 
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(Öniş 1991, p.114) has, however, been transformed with increasing social democracy (Chu 
2009) after the Asian financial crisis. Decision making by an elite few is increasingly 
replaced by a networked governance structure. Larson and Park (2014) describe the 
transformation of South Korea’s developmentalism toward a ‘network state’ featuring rising 
power among private groups in directing the national ICT industry. Democracy and 
government accountability have received more attention partially in response to the 
neoliberalism of institutions such as the World Bank, the rise of civil awareness (Robinson 
and White 1998), and the weakening of bureaucracies’ directedness in favour of steering 
(Stubbs 2009).  
Action power is achieved through sustained bureaucratic power and the proactive 
roles played by the ‘pilot agencies’ of the state, such as the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry, which was described as ‘the greatest concentration of brainpower in Japan’ 
(Johnson 1982, pp.26-8). Even in the US, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, financed 
centrally by the Pentagon, had pioneered innovations in information processing, computing 
and the internet, in which the US has enjoyed a leading position (Block 2008; Mazzucato 
2013). Sufficient resources are the preconditions for high stateness and its implementation 
power according to Tilly (1990), which include fiscal power, legitimacy, skilled manpower, 
and organizational and technical knowledge. National pilot agencies are well-equipped with 
these resources (Low 2005), and the state is generally in tight control of tax and finances 
(Gray et al. 2007), all of which help to enhance the action power of the state. 
Developmental states are outcome driven. High economic growth rates and low 
unemployment provide the resources and capital to reinvest in national priorities, as well as 
the legitimacy and persuasive power enjoyed by the state. Chua (2011, pp.31-2) described 
how the economic success of Singapore had become part of the national identity and a 
guarantee for hard work, reliability and efficiency that its citizens and companies could 
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leverage on when venturing abroad. Yu (1997) identified that export performance was used 
by many developmental states as the most important indicator of progress. Exports, or other 
indicators of international competitiveness, provided a ‘known principle’ by which 
governments adjusted to unforeseen contingencies (Wade 1990).  
The prominence given to international trading surplus and ‘reputation’ by 
developmental states signals the irreducible nature of the state in international relations, an 
extrasocietal function that ‘no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve’ (Nettl, 1968, 
p.559). However it also may divert analytical attention away from important transformations 
taking place with regard to the intrasocietal functions of the state. Indeed, reputation is very 
much a product of the policy credibility that states are able to generate intrasocietally and 
seek to extend extrasocietally – by means that are varied in their territoriality as we describe 
below. Here Singapore is doubly and perhaps uniquely positioned - its attention to the outputs 
of policy reflecting the history of an economy constructed almost entirely from international 
flows of labour and capital and one remaining sensitive to the disciplines of high levels of 
international economic integration (Bardhan, 2016, p.874).     
The entrepreneurial state 
The entrepreneurial state model (Duvall and Freeman 1983) has been referred to widely and 
in diverse ways in the West to capture the response of states to processes of globalisation and 
neoliberalism.1 Initially, Freeman (1982, p.90) had defined state entrepreneurship narrowly as 
‘a policy through which productive enterprises are owned as public agencies but operated in 
accordance with standard business criteria’ Nowadays a broader conception of state 
entrepreneurship analogous to public-private partnerships is apparent with Ebner (1991, 
p.370) reformulated it as ‘specific institutional modes of coordination between the public and 
                                                          
1 The entrepreneurial state literature is heterogeneous in its philosophical underpinnings and 
in its reference to national and local scales. It is important to bear this limitation in mind as 
we bring the term into dialogue with the developmental and post-developmental state 
literature.     
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private sectors that shape industrial capabilities for generating and absorbing new 
technologies’. The blurring of public and private within such partnerships (Hall and Hubbard, 
1996) has seen national and local states have been drawn into the ‘speculative construction of 
place’ (Harvey 1989, p.8). In the process Schumpeterian conceptions of entrepreneurship 
have been re-applied in a one-sided way by scholars to emphasise the extrasocietal activities 
of public sectors.   
It is here that Mazzucato (2013) reopens debate around the potentially leading role of 
the state in broader processes of entrepreneurialism (Block 2008), after being ‘hollowed out’ 
in past decades. In cases where pre-investment is high and market return unpredictable, direct 
intervention by the state is plausible to stimulate the entrepreneurial process (Mazzucato, 
2013) in a manner that is not too far from the developmental interventionism. The 
entrepreneurial state literature also notes how the private sector will normally take the lead in 
developing new products and markets, but what is commonly ‘hidden’ behind this 
spontaneity are the incentives provided by state regulations, funding, tax relief etc., that stem 
from national investment priorities (Eisinger 1988). Governments appear here as brokers 
between the ‘world of regulation’ and the ‘world of profits’. The question that follows is not 
whether the state is needed for market development but how to get the state involved in the 
most effective, productive, and sustainable way. Harvey (1989) and Cox (1993) depicted the 
transition from managerialism to entrepreneurialism at the local level. Local governments 
may better positioned to pursue this agenda (Miao 2018), as they carry fewer nationwide 
public responsibilities while the health of their local economies and tax bases hinge 
significantly on the attraction of inward investment and skilled labour. Notions of the 
entrepreneurial state have therefore stimulated discussion and reflection on governmental 
decentralisation.  
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Regardless of whether we are speaking of technological advance (Mazzucato, 2013) 
or spatial restructuring (Harvey, 1989), the extrasocietally-focused state entrepreneurship 
profiled in this literature challenges notions of a ‘boring, lethargic state’ and has captured the 
imagination of scholars sketching the contours of Asian post/neo-developmental states.  
The post-developmental state  
Scholars perceive the developmental state model as ‘Asia-specified’ (Öniş 1991) with all that 
this implies for problems of reification given its geographic, sectoral and historical specificity 
(Yeung, 2016). Thus, the resilience of developmentalism to processes of neoliberalisation, 
governmental decentralisation and democratic accountability have been questioned (Kim 
1993). Since the 1990s, most developmental states have undergone significant restructuring, 
as captured in the ‘post-developmental state’ (Thurbon and Weiss 2006; Yeung 2016) and 
‘neo-developmental state’ (Hee-Yeon 2000; Kalinowski 2015) discussions. The term 
‘entrepreneurial’ has been substituted for ‘developmental’ to describe the re-making of East 
Asian states (Davis and Ward 1990; Yu 1997).  
Arguably, these works have overplayed the contrasts between entrepreneurial and 
developmental models by adopting a narrow reading of ‘entrepreneurship’ (The Economist 
2013). The extent and nature of changes on the other side of ‘stateness’ – the intrasocietal 
adjustments necessary for a state to qualify as ‘post-developmental’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ - 
are also not clearly established.2 Without an adequate acknowledgement of the legacies of the 
developmental state model, reformulated versions of neo-/post-developmental states and 
notions of entrepreneurial states may overlook important aspects of the closely associated 
processes of economic and state transformation, as well as the reciprocal causation between 
                                                          
2 These issues are compounded by the application of the developmental state model beyond East Asia 
(Riain 2000; Nee et al., 2007) with Block (2008,p172) arguing that developmental state tendencies 
were ‘hidden’ but functioned crucially in targeting resourcing; opening windows; brokering; and 
facilitating in the USA.  
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the states’ intrasocietal (redistribution within its socio-economic structures) and extrasocietal 
(extraterritorial economic and diplomatic outreach) functions. Thus, the strategic coupling of 
post-developmentalism, perceived by Yeung (2016) as a process in which horizontal 
mechanisms of coordination and indirect incentives have largely replaced the vertical 
mechanisms of direct intervention of developmentalism, provides one, but not the only, 
explanation for economic transformation. With its emphasis on partnerships external to the 
state, the post-developmental state literature is silent on the latitude that has existed within the 
large and expert public sector bureaucracies.  
State intrapraneurialism 
Literature on developmental and entrepreneurial states emerged in the 1980s with some states 
being described as both – a fact that is revealing of the fundamentally mixed nature of many 
modern states.3 In reality, as emphasised above, the differences between developmental and 
entrepreneurial states are ones of degree of high and low stateness (Nettl, 1968). Yet little 
explored in the overlaps between the two models are questions of how the state can be 
dynamic from within. 
State intrapreneurship can be defined as the latent or actually existing 
entrepreneurialism apparent within the public sector organisations that make up the state. 
Evans (1997, p.86) notes ‘the returns to more innovative forms of stateness … could be 
prodigious’ and it is our contention that innovative forms of stateness come as much from 
within (as important legacies of the intrasocietal functions of the developmental state) as 
from without (as a reflection of the extrasocietal pressures of globalisation in particular).  
Modern multinational enterprises (MNEs) organised as part of global production 
networks are, if anything, more reliant on the competence of states (Evans 1997, p.72). 
                                                          
3 Singapore has been regarded as developmental (Low, 2001) and entrepreneurial (Pereira, 2004); 
South Korea developmental (Hee-Yeon, 2000) but also networked (entrepreneurial) (Larson and Park, 
2014); China developmental (Nee et al., 2007) yet entrepreneurial (Duckett, 1996).  
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Moreover, ‘in an economy of “ideas” subject to increasing returns rather than “things” 
subject to decreasing ones … the magnitude of returns … depend[s] on authoritative 
decisions’ (Evans 1997, p.77). In order to understand these intrasocietal dynamics that are 
the pre-conditions for the extrasocietal functioning of developmental, entrepreneurial and 
post-developmental states alike, we reconsider the centrality of the state to Schumpeterian 
processes of entrepreneurialism and innovation in the form of: (1) new products/services; (2) 
new processes; (3) new inputs; (4) new markets and; (5) new organisations. Figure 1 
presents a framework which combines the key features of the developmental state (the 
features connected horizontally) and the entrepreneurial state model (running vertically in 
the form of a pyramid). The overlap between the two models comprises our organising 
framework for understanding the intrapreneurial state. In order to further specify the 
sources and functions of intrapreneurialism implied in this overlap, there are three further 
observations we make.  
 
Figure 1. The conjoined framework of developmental and entrepreneurial state 
Source: the authors 
 
Continued state leadership in the setting of industrial priorities 
The designing of industrial priorities provides the point of overlap between the 
entrepreneurial and developmental state models, and reveals the ‘strategic selectivity’ of the 
state (Jessop 1990) as an act akin to entrepreneurship. As well as strategic selectivity, there 
are two further sources of entrepreneurialism associated with leadership in the setting of 
industrial priorities. First, specialisation within states may embody intrapreneurship. Majone 
(1989) has argued that the policy making process has itself become more ‘roundabout’. One 
of the barely elaborated implications of this observation is that states are a source of 
entrepreneurship with regard to the development of new products/services, new processes 
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and new organisational forms. Yu (1999, p.756) offered a detailed account of how public 
entrepreneurs imagine and identify growth opportunities, elaborate them, and then make 
decisions to undertake new projects in order to capture them, which applies equally to 
leadership exercised within developmental states. States overtly create new markets by way 
of regulations but also do so more subtly as intermediaries in a process of ‘economization’ 
(Berman 2014), stimulating the division of labour commonly associated with the private 
sector. Just as in the private sector (Howells 1989), the process of identifying and developing 
new products, services and markets within state is one of experimentation leading to new 
specialist state, quasi-state and private organisations. Second, since the division of labour is 
limited by the extent of the market, the territoriality of the state is an analytical trap (Agnew 
1994) to be avoided and ‘spatial selectivity’ (Jones 1999) something to be alert to when 
considering state intrapreneurialism. The spatial selectivity apparent in the extraterritorial 
reach of states highlights intrapreneurshp as an intrasocietal pre-requisite for the sorts of 
extrasocietal sources of transformation emphasised in much of the extant literature. 
Entrepreneurial strategies can include the spatially-selective opening of new domestic 
markets (via marketing and/or modifying consumption through enhancing the quality of life 
for residents, commuters or visitors) (Jessop and Sum 2000). Historically, states have also 
acted extra-territorially to secure inputs and develop markets. The most intrapreneurial states 
historically and presently have done so in a variety of ways not least because ‘sovereignty—
in the sense of socially constructed practices of political authority—may be exercised 
nonterritorially or in scattered pockets connected by flows across space-spanning networks 
(Agnew 2005, p.441). For small states such intrapreneurialism is necessarily extra-territorial. 
Something as ‘mundane’ as the attraction of FDI can involve ‘strategies that are as complex 
as those adopted by private firms’ (Encarnation and Wells 1986, p.267). The political 
behaviour of MNEs can produce a store of future economic value but can be mirrored by the 
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soft power of extra-territorial actions designed to mobilise reputation or brand extrasocietally 
as an economic asset (Anholt 2007).4 Small states have been particularly adept with regard to 
international diplomacy centred on economic development goals (Baldacchino 2010; Cooper 
and Shaw 2009).   
The leadership and action power present in partnership  
In both entrepreneurial and post-developmental state models, it is public-private partnerships 
that are said to define industrial priorities. These public-private partnerships are central to 
processes of strategic coupling in which post-developmental states engage with global 
production networks. For Yeung (2016, p.20), we have entered ‘a new era in the politics of 
development when capitalist national firms have outgrown their domestic institutions and 
become the main actors in subsequent rounds of industrial transformation’.   
However leadership may come as much from the state as from the private sector. 
Harvey (1989, p.7) argued that: ‘coalition and alliance formation is so delicate and difficult a 
task that the way is open here for a person of vision, tenacity, and skill … to put a particular 
stamp upon the nature and direction of urban entrepreneurialism, perhaps to shape it, even, to 
particular political ends’. For Pasotti (2010, p.13) entrepreneurial government leadership 
centres on brand politics since, ‘politics and markets are converging in their operational 
logics … The basis for this convergence is that entrepreneurs in both spaces increasingly 
pursue their goals of consensus and profit maximization by manipulating preferences and 
striving to shape new values and identities’.  
Moreover, partnership arrangements also appear likely in many instances to have 
their bases in the action power mobilised by developmental states. In contrast to much 
institutional economics, the developmental state literature reminds us that state-owned or 
linked enterprises have been a means to initiate action with regard to collective action 
                                                          
4 China’s state extra-territoriality is driven by issues of resource security but overseas industry parks 
established in Africa also exert soft power (Brautigam and Tang, 2011). 
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problems involving inter-dependent investment decisions (Bardhan, 2016) perhaps prior to 
privatisation. This is partially derived from the motivation-sanction mechanism needed for a 
coherent partnership, but more so in signalling the visions and benefits of it. Larson and Park 
(2014) argue that South Korea had transformed into a network state, in which some powerful 
chaebol industrial groups could effectively influence the industrial priority setting of the 
country. Nonetheless, they also acknowledged the continuing explanatory power of a 
competent bureaucracy. This included the ‘market conforming methods for state intervention, 
but more importantly, the control structured around the state and its agencies, to oversee the 
implementation and evaluation of industrial strategies designed by its private-public 
partnership’ (ibid, p.344). Among the six factors underpinning a functioning partnership 
(Mattessich and Monsey 1992), financial capability and risk tolerance are the key (Johnson 
1989) and these, in turn, have become features of the public sector (Mazzucato 2013) rather 
than the private sector.  
The outcome-oriented nature of intrapreneurship 
The relationship between policy and its outputs remains poorly understood in the academic 
literature and yet is well understood within developmental state practice, whereby states 
typically internalize the positive effects of their own policies. This emphasises not so much 
the extent of intervention but its quality via feedback mechanisms (Bardhan 2016, p.867). 
Thus we suggest that it is the feedback mechanism in Figure 1 that provides an enduring 
legacy of developmentalism in any post-developmental transition.  
‘Public agents are entrepreneurial when they are alert to change, and discover and 
exploit opportunities’ (Yu 1997, p.51). Entrepreneurial states in turn ‘measure the 
performance of their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by 
their goals – their missions – not by their rules and regulations’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992:20). The challenge here, for developmental and entrepreneurial states alike, is how to 
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manage risk in public accountability and control excessive public deficits (The Economist 
2013). These intrasocietal challenges raise the necessity of flexible implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the risk-return balance. Lessons learned, in turn, provide 
valuable inputs to state leadership and partnership, stimulating public learning and error 
elimination, and even significant structural reforms and priority alterations (Miao and Hall 
2013).  
That is, the emerging meta-regulatory role for governments (Levi-Faur 2005) is 
predicated on specialization within the state itself. Thus, ‘While globalization does make it 
harder for states to exercise economic initiative, it also increases both the potential returns 
from effective state action and the costs of incompetence’ (Evans, 1997: 74). In this 
connection, something as mundane as monitoring can be important for state intrapraneurship 
since it helps to alleviate the tendency for institutional amnesia - all too apparent in an age 
when information is ubiquitous (Pollitt 2000) - and the governmental inefficiency associated 
with excessive policy churn.    
Methodology 
We seek to illustrate state intrapreneurship by portraying the emergence of Singapore’s 
smart/sustainable city solutions sector. Singapore is a representative case to examine the 
central theme of this paper given that its development is considered to show signs of both 
entrepreneurialism and developmentalism. Therefore we treat Singapore as one of the best 
places to start the discussion on the possible mechanisms of auto-transformation found within 
developmental states and aspects of intrapreneurialism specifically.    
Two complementary data sources were used in this research. First, we referred to 
secondary data sources such as a significant extant academic literature speaking to policy 
development in Singapore as well as official policy documents and websites. Concerns have 
been raised regarding the lack of controls over secondary data generation (Hakim 1982), but 
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use of these sources is important since this study involves tracing organisational 
developments over recent decades which interviewees may not recall accurately.  
Second, a series of face-to-face interviews were conducted with senior officers from 
some of the major public agencies and GLCs. We conducted 14 interviews in Singapore and 
China with, among others, Economic Development Board (EDB), IE Singapore, Housing 
Development Board, Surbana Corporation, Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC), Singapore 
Cooperative Enterprise (SCE), Ascendas, and Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
between September and October 2015. Interviews were semi-structured around the topics of 
the connections between development and entrepreneurship. There are limitations to the use 
of elite interviews as a research method (Harvey 2011) and there is the potential problem of 
interviewees uncritically replicating the ‘Singapore story’ – a story which has been carefully 
cultivated at home. Nevertheless, the interview method was appropriate and vital to 
generating a more detailed understanding of the subject of state intrapreneurship. Moreover, 
the position of the interview informants – typically directors or deputy directors of the 
organisations concerned – generated a strong measure of critical reflexivity in responses and 
ensured the validity of this particular method. 
Intrapreneurialism in the Smart/Sustainable Urban Solutions Field 
For Evans (1997), Singapore represented a case of high stateness par excellence, given the 
capacity of its state bureaucracy in bargaining with MNEs. However, the intrapreneurialism 
of the Singaporean state in continuously repositioning itself is no less significant than the role 
of the private sector in subsequent processes of state and economic transformation. When 
Singapore gained independence in 1965, it had extremely fragile economic foundations with 
high unemployment, an extremely limited industrial structure and almost no natural resources 
(Gross 2010). This situation helped cultivate an awareness of potential crisis among the first 
generation leaders, and the health of the economy emerged as the overriding strategic priority. 
16 
 
Singapore shifted its economic growth strategy from import substitution to export stimulation 
as early as the 1970s, and constructed a ‘two-leg’ growth engine composed of GLCs and 
MNEs. Its Economic Development Board (EDB) was set up to oversee the industrialisation 
process and continues to hold a decisive role in implementing national priorities (Tay and 
Soh 2015). Such was the success of the Singapore economy that it became home to 
increasingly capital intensive manufacturing and service industries – labour intensive 
industries being offshored initially to its immediate hinterlands in Malaysia and Indonesia as 
part of a ‘growth triangle’ arrangement (Phelps 2004), and then further afield to support a 
broader regionalisation strategy, resulting in the growth of the domestic economy but also a 
state apparatus steering that process (Pereira 2004; Phelps 2007). Today, EDB has been 
joined by a raft of specialised agencies that reflect the diversity and strength of the Singapore 
economy as exporter and overseas investor.  
For Lan (2001, p.3), ‘industrialisation per se has been the priority [of developmental 
states], not considerations of maximising profitability based on current comparative 
advantage’. This was true of the early industrialisation of Singapore, when export promotion 
and attraction of MNEs was the immediate aim (Lee 2000). However, since the late 1970s, 
the leadership in Singapore has strategically selected the most promising sectors that fit the 
city-State’s evolving competitive advantages, something underlined by an interviewee from 
Ascendas (personal communication, September 15, 2015). In its 2015 budgetary plan, five 
industrial priorities were identified, including advanced manufacturing, applied health 
sciences, smart and sustainable urban solutions, logistics and aerospace, and Asian and global 
finance services. Among these, ‘the smart and sustainable urban solutions’ (SSUS) sector is 
interesting, as at first glance, it appears as strategic selection of a brand new sector. One 
nearest sector to SSUS, Real Estate, remains a modest contributor to outward FDI from 
Singapore compared to manufacturing, finance and insurance, but it has a growing weight in 
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the accumulated stock of Singapore’s outward FDI from 6.6% in 1994 to 7.7% in 2014.5 Yet, 
during these two decades Singapore has emerged as a model of city planning and 
development across Asia and indeed globally (Chua 2011; Pow 2014).6  
Intrapreneurial leadership and priority setting in the SSUS field 
Ironically, the urban image and substance of Singapore, so widely aspired to by politicians 
and technocrats across the world, are those the city state had to learn and adapt from 
international experience in the first instance (Lee 2000). When there was no ready-made 
model to look to, Singapore relied on its Ministries and government agencies, GLCs, and 
later privatised GLCs for what have come to be regarded as self-made solutions (Lee 2000). 
The key points here, as emphasised by one of our interviewees (SCE, personal 
communication, September 18, 2015), have been the ostensibly ‘greenfield’ industrialisation 
and urbanisation and the build-up of in-house capability and human resources that stood the 
Singapore government agencies in good stead to pick its industrial priorities, and 
subsequently, export the ‘Singapore model’. Almost all of the government agencies created at 
the outset or soon after Singapore’s independence have evolved, expanded and spawned new 
international divisions and specialist organisations. One interviewee from IE noted the 
problems of the growing scale and complexity of the Singapore economy that arise from 
corresponding specialisation in Government functions (personal communication, September 
16, 2015). It also becomes clear that Singapore state’s internal restructuring went hand in 
hand with its extra-territorial activities, which were intimately associated with its 
intrapreneurial capacities.   
                                                          
5  Source: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/browse-by-theme/investment-tables (accessed 31 
January 2017). 
6 Singapore was mooted (with Switzerland and Norway) as a potential small state model for the UK 
following the referendum decision to exit the European Union (Skilling, 2016). Switzerland was itself 
the benchmark for Singapore at the time of its regionalisation strategy (Interview, Ascendas: 15th Sep 
2015).   
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The top-level institutions involved in the design of Singapore’s strategic priorities are: 
the Economic Development Board (EDB), established in 1957 to fashion an economy from 
overseas investment; the Ministry of National Development (MND) established in 1959, 
responsible for land planning, urban development, construction and open spaces management 
(MND 2015) and; the Ministry of Environment (later named Ministry of the Environment 
and Water Resources) formed in 1972, to tackle various environmental issues (MEWR 2015). 
Famously, these early institutions helped transform Singapore into a garden city after former 
PM Lee’s initial vision, and planted the seeds of its present comparative advantage in, and 
industrial priority of, SSUS. 
Nonetheless, most of the investments by these public institutions were regarded as 
public infrastructure even in the pioneer Jurong Industrial Township, where first-class urban 
design and land planning were seen as necessary to attract foreign investment but with 
minimal value attached to these activities per se. The economic consequence of the 
knowledge accumulated in these spheres only became apparent by the 1980s, when the 
success in attracting manufacturing FDI prompted a remarkable piece of state 
intrapreneurship in the search to ameliorate some of the ‘overheating’ of the Singapore 
economy at that time. The intrapreneurship centred on fashioning a hinterland for Singapore-
anchored manufacturing industries in the adjacent territories of Indonesia and Malaysia, as 
part of the so-called Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) (Phelps, 
2004). Notable here was a first ‘official’ experiment with the government-to-government 
financing, planning, development and operation of an overseas industry park – Batamindo – 
in Indonesia (Perry and Yeoh, 1988). Subsequently, the experience in deploying elements of 
the Singapore model overseas was orchestrated by EDB, and allowed Singapore’s key 
corporations (such as Ascendas, Sembcorp and Surbana) to share knowledge and 
progressively generate the ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al. 1997) or ‘ownership 
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advantages’ (Dunning 1980) that were the basis of their subsequent internationalisation 
(Ascendas, personal communication, September 15, 2015). Such experience also formed the 
basis of further state intrapreneurialism in a regionalisation strategy, which increased the 
breadth and depth of this hinterland with the addition of three other ‘official’ overseas 
industry and technology enclaves (in Bangalore, India and Thu Dau Mot, Vietnam) and the 
more comprehensive China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) (Perry and Yeoh 2000).  
Although many Singaporeans doubted the decision to support these countries in 
grasping the ‘Singapore way of doing business’ (Lee 2000), the returns, in building the 
reputation of Singapore in integrated urban planning and management, environmental 
protection and innovative industrial space design, is apparent by now and increasingly 
materialised by its domestic companies. This regionalisation strategy evolved into a 
globalisation strategy with an increasingly complex division of labour, both within the state 
and among the state, quasi-state, and private actors home and abroad. This evolution thus 
offers initial evidence on how intrasocietal state dynamics paved the way for subsequent 
extrasocietal transformation. However, the ‘Singapore story’ also continues in a reciprocal 
loop where the state’s developmental effort soon stimulated further intrapreneurial 
restructuring: As a direct result of the extra-territoriality described above, a new agency - 
Singapore IE - has been carved out of the Ministry of Finance to provide support for outward 
investment and export promotion. Originally a regulatory-oriented board of trade within the 
Ministry of Finance dealing with the likes of import/export licensing, it was transformed in 
the late 1980s as a result of lobbying from the business community to take on a wider and 
more proactive remit, and then augmented again in 1997 as a stronger and more visible 
agency in support of the globalisation strategy (IE, personal communication, September 16, 
2015).  
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As this reciprocal relation between the state’s intrasocietal and extrasocietal dynamics 
evolves, other Ministries and their boards have adjusted too in ways that specifically reflect 
and support this new industrial priority. MND had been extended from a handful of divisions 
in 1961 to nine agencies and eleven divisions/departments by 2015 (MND 2015). Its two 
latest agencies include Eco-City Project Office and Centre for Liveable Cities, both of which 
focus on promoting the Singapore model in general and supporting SSUS in particular. EDB 
also underwent several rounds of restructuring in order to further divide and specify its 
functions (Wong 2007): The Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) was created in 1967 to take 
over EDB’s industrial real estate development function, and has become the major player in 
spearheading the development of Singapore’s industrial landscape (Tan 1999). JTC itself was 
corporatized in 2000 in order to be more market-facing and to expand its global reach 
(National Library Board 2010). A wholly-owned subsidiary of JTC, Jurong International 
Holdings, was established specifically to offer SSUS to international clients.  
On the financial side, Temasek Holdings Limited (THL) is the major player. Formed 
in 1974 as Singapore’s investment company in local GLCs, THL had over time shifted its 
role from a pure representative for the government to be more entrepreneur-like by 
stimulating strategic ventures (Forshaw 2011). In the new century, THL launched a series of 
restructurings in order to better support world-class enterprises and monitor the 
diversification plans of GLCs (Low 2001, p.421). In terms of SSUS, THL and JTC 
reconfigured four of their operating subsidiaries into one integrated platform in September 
2014 (Temasek 2014). The Deputy Director of Housing Development Board commented that:  
‘Such concentration of resources signifies the government’s intention in 
minimising duplication and competition internally. It also crystallizes the key 
players in this field, with the hope to form an anchor company in leveraging the 
internationally competitive of the whole industrial sector … maybe such 
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flexibility, urged by the State, is one of the key ingredients of the so-called 
“Singapore model”’ (personal communication, September 17, 2015).  
This interviewee’s comment highlights the leadership apparent in the significant 
organisational intrapreneurship of Singapore.  
Returning to figure 1, we can observe how extraterritoriality has been both the subject 
of initial state intrapreneurship surrounding the securing of new hinterland inputs (land and 
labour), and latterly became an input itself to state intrapreneurship in securing overseas 
markets for the emerging SSUS industrial priority specifically. One senior interviewee 
highlighted how a price could not be put on the value of the SIP venture in China; for all of 
the acknowledged difficulties (Pereira, 2002), this venture had opened the Chinese market to 
Singapore’s private sector, and provided a vital training ground for both Singapore and 
Chinese civil servants, many of whom had moved on to obtain more senior government 
positions yet maintained their cross-border mediatory role (IE, personal communication, 
September 16, 2015).  
With each of the three major Singapore-connected projects in China, IE Singapore has 
opened an office, which is supplemented by the establishment of Singapore-China Business 
Councils. The latter are oriented to discussing and resolving business frictions but also serve 
as valuable listening posts to gauge emerging business opportunities in China (IE, personal 
communication, September 16, 2015). Changes in how China is viewed within Singapore 
government circles have been the main stimulus for this. As our interviewee described,  
‘In the past we used to look to China for the sake of tapping the market. Sell 
something to China or produce something in China. Today we look at China quite 
differently. When we speak about technology we cannot ignore what is going on 
in China. Some of the most cutting-edge things that are happening - supply chain 
and business models - are from China. So we are paying closer attention to this 
country’ (IE, personal communication, September 16, 2015).  
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These observations extend to the SSUS field as revealed by the story of organisational 
restructuring and expanding market presence centred on the Housing Development Board 
(HDB). At the time SIP was being mooted in the 1980s, the HDB was, as a Singapore 
government body, unable to be involved in master planning despite requests from the Chinese 
government. However, in recognition of this lost opportunity, HDB quickly formed a new 
venture – CESMA International – in 1989 through which it later participated in SIP and a 
series of other official and unofficial developments across Southeast Asia and China. 
CESMA was fully corporatized into Surbana in 2003 and since then has been involved in 
projects further afield in India, the Middle East and Africa. In the first instance, several of 
these overseas developments were solely or primarily commercial, but now Singapore 
consortia including Surbana are only involved in mixed-use developments, precisely for the 
pragmatic reason that profit margins are higher for residential than commercial developments 
(Surbana, personal communication, September 14, 2015), as exemplified in its latest Tianjin 
Eco-City investment portfolio (Tianjin Eco-City Planning Bureau, personal communication, 
October 12, 2015). Moreover, despite the legend of the Singapore model, our interviewee 
noted significant competition from both national planning institutes and major MNEs 
operating in China, so that Surbana had embarked on a series of acquisitions partly to build 
additional capabilities. The same interviewee also noted how the original neighbourhood unit 
model pioneered by the HDB has evolved several times - with greater densities now 
beginning to emerge in Singapore that resemble those, and reflect the influence of, Chinese 
practice (Surbana, personal communication, September 14, 2015). The deeper insight that 
this example of state intrapreneuralism offers lies in the strengthened policy learning and 
resource mobilising capabilities generated through the reciprocal relationship between the 
state’s intrasocietal and extrasocietal functions. 
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Since the early 2000s, green technology, urban management and smart growth have 
become salient and Singapore responded quickly in capitalising on its reputation in this field. 
In 2014 the PM Lee Hsien Loong launched a new vision for the city-state to be the ‘world's 
leading Smart Nation’ where ‘people live meaningful and fulfilled lives, enabled seamlessly 
by technology, offering exciting opportunities for all’ (Cheam 2015). In 2015, ‘Smart and 
Sustainable Urban Solutions’ was formally chosen by Singapore as one of its five key growth 
areas, which demonstrated the State’s role in creating new sectors and products. Again top-
down intrapreneurial leadership is far from absent in this process as our interviewee from IE 
Singapore revealed another story:  
‘In my mind the Singapore government has been very careful in picking the 
‘winners’ as the next strategic sectors. Quite often, the attempt to develop new 
sectors will involve intensive discussions with independent consultants and 
industrial leaders. We now have the sustainable urban solutions as one of our 
priority areas, because we have all the necessary institutional, physical, 
commercial and financial infrastructures ready, and our companies are confident 
in leading this emerging market’ (personal communication, September 16, 2015).  
An extended ‘embedded authoritarianism’ has been apparent in the fashioning of this new 
strategic priority, as will be discussed below. 
The action power in partnerships in the SSUS field 
The crucial role played by the People’s Action Party (PAP) in creating the ‘Singapore model’ 
is well documented (Lee 2000; Low 2001). Nonetheless, the Singapore State increasingly 
relies on various elite alliances both within PAP and in the wider society for achieving what 
has been described as ‘embedded authoritarianism’ (Chua 1995, p.59). One case in point is 
the delicate relationship between PAP and the majority ethnic Chinese Community in 
Singapore (Haque 2004). The former President of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce remarked that:  
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‘The establishment of our organisation was highly supported by PAP, and our 
Committee members normally serve in various important government agencies 
such as EDB. We are heard and supported by PAP as there are many ways for us 
to get involved in the decision making process, and we are quite often consulted 
in the making of strategic decisions’ (personal communication, September 10, 
2015).    
Partnerships between the government and companies have also played a particularly 
important role in Singapore’s SSUS agenda. To foster such partnerships, Singapore has 
positioned itself as a ‘living laboratory’, in which domestic and foreign companies are 
encouraged to test and commercialise innovative solutions using its urban infrastructure 
(Calder, 2016). In this arrangement, companies benefit from perfecting their products in 
Singapore before scaling up for the wider Asian and global markets. Singapore also benefits 
from accessing state-of-the-art technologies when being regarded as the ‘showcase’ of future, 
sustainable urban growth worldwide7. Moreover, partners enjoy great freedom in piloting 
projects under the umbrella of the SSUS state priority. Panasonic is using Punggol Eco-Town 
in Singapore to test and commercialise its ‘total energy solution’. Siemens is pioneering CO2 
reduction opportunities in the Tampines district (Webb 2012). At the same time, the 
Singapore government, through its pilot agencies and GLCs, is also proactive in exploring 
new market opportunities; EDB and Veolia (France) have a joint Sustainable Cities Centre of 
Excellence for the design and planning of eco-towns (Yip 2013). In the area of clean 
technology solutions, MNEs, SMEs, GLCs and various state agencies were involved in what 
the Chairman of the Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC) described as a ‘collaborative alignment’ 
approach (personal communication, September 18, 2015). These emerging 
interorganisational networks capturing SSUS potentials require flexible institutional 
                                                          
7  Singapore was ranked the smartest global city by Juniper Research 
(https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/singapore-named-global-smart-city-2016, 
assessed on 12/02/2017. 
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arrangements, quick reaction to the market, and innovative financial arrangements, which 
further pushes reconfigurations in state agencies and GLCs. The feedback loop between 
leadership, partnership and action power of the state (figure 1) consolidates this process. 
The conception and operation of overseas industrial parks demonstrate state 
intrapraneurship in arriving at the SSUS priority but they also have provided the test-bed for 
new products/services and new working processes for its agencies involved in this sector. In 
many of these overseas ventures, an inbuilt ‘knowledge transfer’ package on planning and 
industrial space management was exported (Tan 1995), which not only leveraged the physical 
built environment of these estates, but also enhanced the reputation of Singapore in the SSUS 
field. A bilateral ‘Knowledge Transfer Office’ was set up under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in Singapore and SIP when the latter was established in 1992 (Pereira 2002). Its 
three-level transfer packages, regular training and manager rotations have helped SIP to 
become an ‘exporter’ of a modified Singapore model suitable for China to other domestic 
regions (Director of SIP Learning Singapore Experience Office, personal communication, 
October 14, 2015). Since then China had quickly become the largest client of ‘Singapore 
solutions’ (Zhang 2012), allowing Singapore to mobilise its Chinese ethnic and social ties to 
maximise potential returns. One case in point is the targeted training programmes offered to 
senior Chinese officials by Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, whose qualification 
was recognised the earliest by the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs in China. 
In this sense, state intrapreneurialism plays a strong steering role in shaping extrasocietal 
relations and reputation.  
Entering the new century, the Asian market is changing which requires the adaptation 
of the Singapore state as mentioned earlier by our interviewee from IE Singapore. The 
marketing officers of CLC revealed two reasons:  
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‘It seems to us that many Asian countries are getting richer, and become pickier 
of whom they want to learn from. We are increasingly competing with 
consultants from North America and European regions. On the other hand, 
Singapore’s expertise in the more traditional industrial estates needs upgrading, 
as our partners copy quickly the techniques of planning and the designs of 
infrastructure’ (personal communication, September 18, 2015).  
Correspondingly, Singapore adjusted its orientation through two main approaches. 
Firstly, The Singapore government has increasingly been drawn to and invested in its own 
capabilities with regard to South America and Africa as potential markets. According to the 
Deputy Chairman of IE Singapore,  
‘We invest in wherever our companies want to do businesses. There is substantial 
market expansion in Africa for example among our manufacturing companies, so 
we go there, talk to the local and Central governments, sign memorandums, and 
formalise a pro-Singapore network. We want to make sure our companies have a 
benign environment there’ (personal communication, September 16, 2015).  
Secondly, Singapore has upgraded its products/services offer to ‘smart/sustainable 
urban solutions’ – something yet to be fully exploited even in developed countries - providing 
it with a lucrative market. For example, Singapore’s electronic road pricing system has been 
studied by various global cities (Chua 2011, p.33). London and Melbourne had already put in 
place a version of this system. In China, Singapore’s latest investment was the Tianjin Eco-
city commenced in 1996. Instead of helping Tianjin attract FDI and building factories as with 
SIP, the purpose of this Eco-city was to trial the feasibility, replicability and effectiveness of 
Singapore’s SSUS capabilities before rolling them out across China. Outcome-based market 
exploration has won Singapore a leading position in the global smart city market. This is 
achieved through its continuous market monitoring and risk taking, as well as strong and 
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decisive State support and investment—an intrapreneurial ingredient of a state that has mixed 
developmental-entrepreneurial credentials – to which we now turn.   
Outcomes as feedback in SSUS strategic priority  
Market outcomes are crucial indicators for developmental states’ priority settings as shown in 
Singapore’s exploration of the SSUS strategy. Overseas industry parks have provided not just 
markets or additional labour inputs for established manufacturing industries but also test-beds 
– knowledge inputs – for what was to be Singapore’s latest strategic priority. Subsequently, 
these opportunities have been further amplified by ‘many instances in which Singaporean 
public policies and state entrepreneurial activities have been studied and copied by other 
governments’ (Chua 2011, p.32). Singapore is doubly advantaged in its ability to deploy 
extraterritoriality; as a city state it participates in fora intended for nation states and city 
governments and leaders (Calder 2016, p.150). Much of the high demand from overseas 
governments for study visits to Singapore is still handled in a very decentralised way (IE, 
personal communication, September 16, 2015). However, reorganisation and innovation have 
been aimed as much at facilitating strong market outcomes as improving coordination.  
Even something as simple as documenting the Singapore pathway has produced 
business opportunities and innovation within government agencies. One of the latest 
reconfigurations between MND and MEWR is the creation of the Centre for Liveable Cities 
(CLC) in 2008, which functions as a Think-Tank specialised in sustainable urban 
development, and the focus point and front desk in broadcasting Singapore’s SSUS industry. 
It achieved this by providing tailor-made products and services to other countries and cities 
based on Singapore's expertise. Its ‘Leaders in Urban Governance Programme’, with a 
starting cost of S$15,000 (10,561 USD), offers a four-week study in Singapore, comprising 
of in-class workshops and seminars, site visits of private and public promises, and overseas 
field trips. Moreover, CLC has taken on activities with an outward facing remit such as 
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organising international mega-events. Its 2012 World Cities Summit drew over 19,000 
participants from more than 100 countries (Ng 2012), which further strengthened the role of 
Singapore as a world leader in SSUSs and demonstrated Singapore’s efforts to build a 
platform that goes beyond the island’s shores (Gross 2010). Table 1 provides an indication of 
the scale and variety of activities coordinated by CLC in recent years. Geographical 
breakdowns of participants to the World Cities Summit Mayors Forum revealed the weight of 
interest from African nations and cities. On average participants from this region have made 
up one half of all participants between 2008 and 2012.8  
 
Table 1 Capability development and advisory activities by CLC  
Source: Central for Liveable Cities (CLC 2017) 
 
The interest of visiting delegations is less in Singapore as it is today than in how 
Singapore has achieved what it has (CLC, personal communication, September 18, 2015). 
The same interviewee noted that another mission of CLC has therefore been to document the 
Singapore story and the practices that lie behind its success while those directly involved are 
still alive. This emphasis on the mundane of documenting ‘old’ knowledge and monitoring 
and evaluating policies is important to realising future economic value, and contrasts starkly 
with the policy churn and institutional amnesia associated with liberal market states (Pollitt, 
2000). It can be contrasted with the British new towns which, although widely studied and 
copied, were neither properly evaluated nor systematically exploited by the British 
government or allied private sectors. Here Singapore’s state intrapreneurialism has been a 
key contributor to both its wider intrasocietal legitimacy but also its extrasocietal reputation.        
                                                          
8 Source: http://www.clc.gov.sg/documents/annualreport_doc/CLCAR1213Book.pdf 
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State intrapreneuriaship is revealed in the fact that strategic priorities are never just 
priorities without an outcome. Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE) is a government 
agency that now sits within IE Singapore. It was formed by the MFA and the MTI in 2006 in 
order to coordinate requests for visits to these two ministries. Some indication of the extent 
and magnitude of the international market generated around the priority of SSUS is provided 
by the fact that, for the SCE, China used to be its largest customer before 2014 with delegates 
peaking at over 2000 in three months (personal communication, September 18, 2015). Since 
its formation, SCE has undertaken 200 projects in over 40 countries, and signed numerous 
memoranda of understanding (figure 2) (SCE 2016), though these are heavily skewed 
towards China and Asia-Pacific. However, even for a body like SCE,  
‘We don’t just do something for the sake of doing it … but rather what are the 
implications of handling these requests? …  We have two objectives. One is the 
diplomatic one. The other one, from MTI’s point of view, is to bring Singapore 
companies overseas’ (SCE, personal communication, September 18, 2015).  
 
Figure 2 Memoranda of understandings signed by SCE  
Source: Adapted from SCE (2016) 
 
These twin objectives converge in the case of SSUS around which much of the current 
interest from overseas centred. Moreover, we noticed that outcomes had become even the 
focus of who was trained. Our interviewee noted how they seek to train mid-level civil 
servants who are able either to sign off, or advocate for, given projects in their home 
countries, or are seen as being likely to rise to higher levels of government in the near future 
(SCE, personal communication, September 18, 2015). By helping to build intrasocietal state 
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capacity abroad, the Singapore state has strengthened its own extrasocietal reputation and 
influence.   
Conclusion 
As two accounts rivalling minimalist state ideology, developmental and entrepreneurial state 
theories were developed in parallel to emphasise the persistent, albeit adjusted, roles of the 
state in dealing with external pressures from globalisation, decentralisation and neo-
liberalisation. In this paper, we have sought to link these two models in an organising 
framework that draws attention to state inrapreneurialism as part of the intrasocietal dynamics 
of states, as well as a reaction to extrasocietal pressures. Using the Singapore state and its 
strategic promotion of the smart/sustainable urban solutions sector to illustrate the 
contribution of state intrapreneurialism, we believe this paper further contributes to an 
understanding of processes of post- or neo-developmental state transformation in Asia.  
Our evidence on the emergence of SSUS in Singapore suggested how the emergence 
of this priority involved significant state intrapreneurialism based on path dependent 
opportunities. Singapore’s accumulated expertise with land planning, infrastructure 
management and natural resource protection conferred a lead in the ‘urban solutions’ market 
upon this city-state – a lead consciously nurtured by the state through its pilot agencies and 
GLCs. For the state to adjust its priority setting, several interorganisational networks are 
mobilised for assembling evidence, financing and exploring market potentials. An interesting 
question arising is for how long Singapore’s state-dominated leadership can remain valid, 
given its ambition to become the world’s ‘living laboratory’. The fact that MNEs are using 
whole estates or districts of Singapore as testbeds for their urban solutions suggests the 
possibility that Singapore’s next industrial priority may indeed emerge from these private 
laboratories, changing once again the partnership-leadership structure.    
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We believe the case of Singapore is appropriate to examine ideas of state 
intrapreneurialism. Yet ‘Singapore is at once an anomalous outlier and a potentially evocative 
paradigm’ (Calder, 2016, p.163). On the one hand, it is unique and non-replicable given its 
city-state, one-party character. Moreover, the embryonic nature of the SSUS industry in 
Singapore requires further study in order to trace its growth trajectory – perhaps in 
comparative perspective. On the other hand, the Singapore state has departed least from the 
developmental state model (Yeung, 2016) and the value of the case can be seen in how many 
of Singapore’s Asian neighbouring states are also investing heavily and developing expertise 
in this particular industry sector in a process of catch up. In the case of China, around 200 
smart city platforms and approximately 400 eco-cities have been launched. The scale of its 
domestic market is a significant source of the ‘ownership advantages’ (Dunning, 1980) or 
‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, 1997) that are said to drive the expansion of MNEs. ‘Like 
Japan and Korea before it, yet in a more globalized way, Singapore has worked 
systematically not only to generate ideas of technical significance but also to test and to 
commercialize them – becoming a “living laboratory” … focused on operationalizing real-
world applications’ (Calder, 2016, p.140). It will be interesting to observe how processes of 
catch up in this SSUS industry could prompt further intrapreneurialism on the part of states in 
decades to come. 
Curiously, for all its emphasis on public-private partnerships, the post-developmental 
state literature tends to reinstate a residual sense of the state-market dichotomy that the 
developmental state literature rather overcame. Yet, the entrepreneurial state model does not 
capture fully the extent, nature or sources of state intrapreneurialism. Although the 
developmental state model increasingly appears a period piece, conjoined with elements 
found in the entrepreneurial state literature, it continues to offer value in an explanation of the 
linked processes of state and economic transformation. The issues we explore in this paper 
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underline the value of bringing the (post)developmental state literature into dialogue with the 
mainstream of institutional economics of the state (Bardhan, 2016). Overly strident 
oppositions between the developmental state, on the one hand, and entrepreneurial, post- or 
neo-developmental state models, on the other, may obscure important continuities that exist 
in institutional-economic transformations.  
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